The effect of double taxation treaties and territorial tax systems on foreign direct investment: evidence for Spain by Castillo-Murciego, A. & Lopez-Laborda, J.
 Vol. 13,  2019-22 | March 11, 2019 | http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2019-22 
 
 
 
The effect of double taxation treaties and territorial 
tax systems on foreign direct investment: evidence for 
Spain 
 
Ángela Castillo-Murciego and Julio López-Laborda 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper evaluates the effect of Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) on Spain’s inward 
and outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for the period 1993–2013. Estimates 
produce positive and statistically significant coefficients. However, there are some 
differences between the inbound and outbound samples, the type of DTT and the group 
of developed and developing FDI partner countries. Moreover, interpretation of results 
differs depending on the fixed or random effects estimation technique used. The paper 
also analyses the effect on FDI of the rules agreed in DTTs and applied by the investors’ 
residence country in order to correct international double taxation. The authors conclude 
that the tax saving derived from the application by Spain of the territorial system is 
positively related to investment from this country to abroad. However, the tax saving 
provided by the application by the partner countries of the territorial system does not have 
a significant effect on the investment of these countries into Spain. 
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1 Introduction 
As Blonigen et al. (2014: 1) state, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) “and related foreign affiliate 
activities by multinational firms play a primary role in the global economy” at present. While in 
the 90s the inward and outward worldwide FDI stock of countries accounted for around 9–10% 
of GDP, this percentage grew to reach 34% in 2015 (UNCTAD).1 As Barrios and Benito (2010) 
noted, there was a similar rise in FDI in Spain during the same period. From the 90s Spain 
became a net capital exporter, in “the most advanced phases of the FDI development cycle” 
(López Duarte and García Canal, 2002: 31), Latin American countries being the most important 
destination countries at that time (Gordo et al., 2008). Today Spain has become a leading 
country in terms of FDI. According to Myro (2014), Spain’s inward and outward investment 
represented around 2.8% of total worldwide FDI in 2014. 
Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) are bilateral Agreements between countries and are the 
main instrument for coordinating international taxation in the field of direct taxes. Worldwide, 
the number of DTTs has risen from 100 in the 60s (Egger et al., 2006) to approximately 3000 at 
present and Spain is a signatory to 86 of them, the first dating back to the 60s. As with FDI, the 
main increase took place in the 90s and 00s, and nowadays most FDI flows are covered by them 
(Radaelli, 1997). Despite these facts, there is still no consensus in the empirical literature about 
the effect of these Agreements on FDI. From a theoretical point of view, on the one hand, DTTs 
could foster FDI as they limit double taxation situations and offer legal certainty of the fiscal 
conditions for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). On the other hand, they might affect invest-
ments negatively as they reduce their options for tax minimising strategies. 
The limitation of double taxation of foreign income was the original function of DTTs as 
globalisation increased in the 60s and 70s. DTTs include several provisions devoted to this 
function. They allocate the taxing rights for each kind of income and capital between the 
residence and the source country; delimitate double taxation relief mechanisms; limit the 
withholding tax rates applied by the source country; and harmonise main fiscal definitions. 
Thanks to this function, DTTs should affect FDI positively, since MNEs would stop paying 
taxes to more than one jurisdiction. This is the main theoretical argument that predicts a positive 
effect of DTTs on FDI and it is the one referred to in the OECD Model Tax Convention. The 
reduction of uncertainty concerning the fiscal conditions of income and capital may also 
reinforce the MNEs’ investments. DTTs do that by preventing double taxation, limiting the 
unilateral action of governments (Jones, 1996) and introducing mechanisms for solving fiscal 
conflicts (Gravelle, 1988).  
DTTs lessen the tax evasion and avoidance schemes of MNEs by improving the exchange of 
information between the contracting states, helping them in the fulfilment of the arm’s length 
prices principle, and more recently, limiting the treaty shopping strategy of corporations (Baker, 
2014). This function might limit the possible extra profits MNEs attain, and thus might affect 
their investments negatively. Lawyers specialising in international taxation, such as Gravelle 
(1988), Radaelli (1997) or Dagan (2000), emphasise this last function of DTTs. 
_________________________ 
1 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds. Similarly, worldwide international trade of goods and services went from 18% of 
GDP in the 90s to 27% in 2015. 
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Taking into account all the above arguments, the average result of DTTs on FDI is not clear, 
as not all their functions impact investments in the same direction (Davies et al., 2010). Thus, 
the result has to be determined empirically. Finding a positive outcome is important given the 
high creation costs of these Agreements, which are similar to those originated by other inter-
national Agreements.2 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of DTTs on the volume of FDI inflows and 
outflows between Spain and the corresponding contracting state for the period 1993–2013. 
Initially, we examine the effect of the mere existence of DTTs, as usually done in the empirical 
literature. We do this for the whole sample and the subsamples of developed and developing 
partner countries of Spain. Subsequently, the impact of some of the content of the Agreements 
together with the internal legislation of countries is evaluated: specifically, the effect of the tax 
saving derived from the investor’s country of residence applying the Territorial Tax System for 
the taxation of foreign income. This is a topic that has not yet been addressed in Spanish 
economic literature.3  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the empirical 
literature on DTTs and FDI. Section 3 carries out the empirical analyses of the effect of the 
existence of DTTs on FDI. Section 4 develops an additional analysis of the effect of the tax 
saving arising from the application of the Territorial Tax System on FDI. Section 5 accom-
plishes a robustness check and conclusions are summarised in Section 6.  
Results show that DTTs are positively correlated to Spain’s inward and outward FDI, 
although there are some differences depending on the kind of DTT and partner country. For 
developed partners, the positive effect comes from both old and new DTTs, i.e. DTTs created 
before and after the beginning of the data sample, respectively. For developing partners, that 
effect comes entirely from new DTTs and only with regard to investments from Spain to these 
countries. Moreover, the tax saving provided to Spanish firms by the application by Spain of the 
Territorial Tax System to eliminate international double taxation is positively related to Spain’s 
outward FDI. However, the tax saving provided by the application by the partner countries of 
the Territorial system does not have a significant effect on the investment of these countries into 
Spain. 
2 Review of the empirical literature on the effect of double 
taxation treaties on foreign direct investment 
The huge growth in FDI during the 90s together with governments’ interest in attracting such 
flow has generated a great deal of empirical literature on the determinants of this type of 
investment. For government policies, much of the attention has focused on tax policies (Davies 
_________________________ 
2 The creation costs of DTTs are especially high for developing countries. An analysis about the effect of DTTs on 
FDI regarding Latin American countries can be seen in Peragón Lorenzo (2013). 
3 Indeed, economic literature on any international taxation topic is rather scarce in Spain. It is only possible to point 
to the papers of Domínguez and López-Laborda (2008) and Castillo-Murciego and López-Laborda (2017), both on 
the issue of profit shifting.  
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et al., 2010). De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) estimated an elasticity of –3.3 of FDI to tax rates 
from a meta-analysis of 25 empirical studies. There are also other kinds of policies which might 
have affected FDI, as might the institutional quality of governments (see, for instance, 
Garcimartín et al., 2011 or Goodspeed et al., 2011). 
Within the tax policy area, DTTs are fairly new for the empirical economic examination of 
the determinants of FDI4 and there are still no conclusive results on the relationship between the 
two variables. Blonigen and Davies (2000) were the first authors who examined the effect of 
these international Agreements on investments. Although these authors first found a positive 
effect of DTTs on FDI for a sample of US bilateral data from 1966 to 1992, later they obtained 
the opposite result for new DTTs for a sample of OECD countries (Blonigen and Davies, 2002) 
and a sample of the US (Blonigen and Davies, 2004). The results are also heterogeneous for the 
subsequent studies on DTTs and FDI. Table A1 in the Appendix summarises the empirical 
literature on this topic. 
It is possible to point to several methodological reasons for these inconclusive results found 
in the literature: the model and sample used, or the selected indicators. There is no single model 
for the determinants of FDI. Specific studies investigating the effect of DTTs on FDI have 
usually used either the gravity model of Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhbnen (1963) or the 
knowledge-capital model of Markusen (1997, 2002). As to the sample used, Barthel et al. 
(2010) noticed that positive results of DTTs on FDI were obtained when authors had access to 
bigger samples, which were those constructed from aggregate data (di Giovanni, 2005 or 
Neumayer, 2007). However, authors who used smaller samples of bilateral data got negative 
results (Davies, 2003; Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Egger et al., 2006; or Coupé et al., 2009).  
Several indicators have been used for measuring FDI, most frequently stock, flows or sales 
of foreign affiliates, while some authors employed others: mergers and acquisitions (di 
Giovanni, 2005) or rates of return on FDI (Louie and Rousslang, 2008).  
From our point of view, the indicator used for measuring the effect of DTTs is more 
important than the above issues. This has usually been a binary variable representing the 
existence or non-existence of the Agreement. This simple indicator is useful for measuring the 
average effect of Agreements. However, it does not allow one to draw many conclusions about 
the origin of the results. For this, indicators are needed to measure the specific content of DTTs. 
Even though all DTTs accomplish the same functions and most governments take the OECD 
Model Tax Convention as a reference when drafting them, the specific content and clauses of 
DTTs can differ. Moreover, DTTs must be simultaneously interpreted together with countries’ 
own laws. As Blonigen and Davies (2002) state “…treaties certainly differ from each other 
along many dimensions which are very difficult to quantify. In addition, the same treaty on 
paper can have vastly different consequences for different pairs of countries depending on the 
unilaterally-adopted tax practices of the countries before entering the treaty” (p. 11–12). 
Studies delving into the content of DTTs are scarce due to the difficulty of measuring these 
differences. Blonigen and Davies (2000) estimated the effect of the limitation of withholding tax 
_________________________ 
4 There are also some papers in the Spanish literature on the determinants of FDI. For instance, on Spanish inbound 
FDI, we can point to Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994), Rodríguez and Pallás (2008), Villaverde and Maza 
(2012) or Gutiérrez-Portilla et al. (2016). As for Spanish outbound FDI, we can mention Barrios and Benito (2010), 
Gordo and Tello (2008), Martínez-Martín (2011) or Alguacil et al. (2017). However, none of them analyse the effect 
of DTTs. 
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rates by DTTs and concluded that this was not the only function of them that impacted FDI 
positively. More recently, Bösenberg et al. (2016) analysed the effect of DTTs regarding three 
specific dimensions of their content: complexity in the writing and structure, generosity 
depending on the double taxation relief method, and the exchange of information clause. They 
found that while DTTs’ complexity and, to a lesser extent, information exchange seem to affect 
FDI negatively, DTTs’ generosity seems to benefit FDI.  
The literature also refers to a possible endogeneity problem between DTTs and FDI. As 
Blonigen and Davies (2002: 15) state, “If we get a positive correlation between our tax treaty 
variable and our dependent variable, FDI activity, it is not clear whether other unobservable 
characteristics of the tax treaty country pairings may be leading to both increased FDI activity 
and a tax treaty”. In order to deal with this potential problem, these authors and some others 
subsequently, distinguish between the so-called old and new DTTs, or those created before and 
after the beginning of the data sample, respectively. Blonigen and Davies (2002: 15) argue that 
“’new’ treaties afford a much better opportunity to measure the impact of a tax treaty, as we 
have data on FDI activity both before and after the treaty takes place”. 
More recently, Hearson (2018), focused on developing countries, claims that the positive 
expectation of inward FDI may influence the creation of DTTs. Additionally, some other 
authors have used alternative solutions to manage the possible endogeneity problem. For 
instance, Egger et al. (2006) and Davies et al. (2010) applied instrumental variables regressions.  
In addition to the methodological issues, some authors have demonstrated that the effect of 
DTTs vary depending on certain circumstances, such as the level of investment of the 
contracting states (Kumas and Millimet, 2017), the composition of sales (Davies et al., 2010) or 
the economic sector involved (Blonigen et al., 2014). These last authors derived a higher 
positive effect of DTTs on FDI for firms using differentiated inputs and justified that such firms 
benefit from the Mutual Agreement Procedure once a DTT is in place. Table A1 of the 
Appendix completes this review. 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Methodology and data 
The econometric specification used to examine how the existence of a DTT affects Spain’s FDI 
with the corresponding contracting state rests on the knowledge-capital model. This is a general 
equilibrium model which reconciles the two traditional motivations of FDI:5 horizontal and 
vertical. Horizontal FDI originates in Markusen (1984) and is based on market access reasons, 
and vertical FDI originates in Helpman (1984) and is based on labour costs savings. There are 
other previous and subsequent models for the determinants of FDI. However, the knowledge-
capital model captures the two traditional motives of cross-border investments and fits the data 
well. Besides, literature on the effect of DTTs on investments has generally used either the 
_________________________ 
5 First theories on MNEs and FDI go back to the 60s and are based on perfect competition models (Latorre, 2009). 
The denominated traditional FDI motivations originated from the 80s. 
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gravity model or the knowledge-capital model. Comparing both, while the gravity model 
captures the horizontal motive of cross-border direct investments only and has no theoretical 
foundation for FDI,6 the knowledge-capital model covers these two issues.7  
The newer FDI models are more sophisticated and complex than older ones, but are also 
based on the two traditional motivations of FDI. The main difference between older and newer 
models is that the former are based on bilateral FDI relations, while the latter take multilateral 
ones into account. As a consequence, both traditional motivations can underlie an FDI-only 
pattern. An example is export platform FDI (Ekholm et al., 2007), “where a MNE places FDI 
into a host country to serve as a production platform for exports to a group of (neighbouring) 
host countries” (Blonigen, 2005: 393). In this example, the vertical motivation underlies the 
decision of where to locate FDI and the horizontal one underlies the decision of which countries 
to serve from there. 
Specifically, we estimate Equations (1.1) and (1.2) below, which are based on the reduced-
form empirical framework of Carr et al. (2001) derived from the knowledge-capital model of 
Markusen. For the outbound sample: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼9ln (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑠) + 𝜌𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 (1.1) 
And for the inbound sample: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝐿 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2𝑙𝐿 (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝐿 (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼9𝑙𝐿 (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑠) + 𝜌𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 (1.2) 
The dependent variable of Equations (1.1) and (1.2) is an indicator of the bilateral FDI 
between Spain, s, and a country j, and t  is the time period. The estimate is made for two data 
samples: Spain’s outward and inward FDI. Spain (the partner country) is the home (host) 
country of investment for the outbound sample and the host (home) country for the inbound 
sample. Each sample encompasses an unbalanced panel of FDI between Spain and the OECD,8 
the EU-28,9 the BRIC10 and some Latin American countries,11 for the period 1993–2013. The 
aforementioned groups of countries comprise those countries which are the main partners for 
_________________________ 
6 The gravity model has a theoretical foundation from international trade. This is the reason why it has been used for 
examining the determinants of FDI, since FDI literature has traditionally taken trade literature as a reference.  
7 For further information about the theoretical and empirical motivations for FDI see, for example, Blonigen and 
Piger (2014), Helpman (2011) or Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
8 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom and 
United States 
9 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
10 Brazil, Russia, India and China 
11 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela 
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Spain in terms of FDI. A supplementary criterion is data availability. Moreover, the use of 
symmetric samples let us compare the results for each one of them.  
From the knowledge-capital model variables of Equations (1.1) and (1.2), which are those 
multiplied by the coefficient αi, we must distinguish between the knowledge-capital variables in 
the strict sense and the other explanatory variables. Knowledge-capital variables capturing the 
horizontal FDI are constructed from the GDP of countries: the logarithm of GDP sum (ln (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)) 
and the logarithm of GDP difference squared (ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 )). Those capturing the vertical FDI are 
constructed from the level of qualification of countries: level of qualification difference (𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠) 
and level of qualification difference squared times the trade openness of the host 
country (𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ; 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ). Additionally, non-linearity is captured by the interaction term of 
the level of qualification difference times the logarithm of the GDP difference: �𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)�. 
Differences in the countries’ GDP and qualification are calculated in absolute values, following 
Blonigen et al. (2003).  
The other explanatory variables are the trade openness of the home and host countries 
(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠),12 the investment barriers of the host country (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠;  𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠) and the logarithm of the 
geographical distance between both countries (ln (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑠)). Note that the latter will not be 
identified in the presence of country-pair fixed effects. Additionally we add our variable of 
interest to the model: a binary variable for measuring the existence of a DTT between Spain and 
the other country (𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠). It takes the value of one for years when a DTT existed between Spain 
and the corresponding partner country and the value of zero for years when no DTT existed. 
Lastly, non-observable country-pair effects (𝜂𝑠𝑠) and yearly dummy variables (𝜕𝑠) are also 
incorporated into the model.  
The expected sign of most of the variables depends on the underlying kind of FDI 
motivation. However, this paper concentrates on examining the effect of DTTs. This effect is a 
priori uncertain as deduced from Section 2: DTTs could foster FDI by reducing the double 
taxation problem and creating a greater level of legal security for investors, or on the contrary, 
they might affect it negatively by preventing the tax evasion and avoidance strategies of MNEs 
and thus, the tax minimising possibilities for them. 
The data source of the model variables is the following. FDI data are taken from 
DataInvex,13 from the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism. They are measured as 
gross inflows and outflows and are converted into real 2005 USD. They include all economic 
sectors and exclude holding company operations and are selected according to the immediate 
holder criterion, which does not reflect the last origin of investment to Spain, nor the last 
destination of investment from Spain.  
The real GDP and the trade openness of the contracting states is gathered from the World 
Bank Development Indicators database;14 the level of qualification of the countries, from Barro 
and Lee (2013); the investment barriers of the host country, from the Economic Freedom 
_________________________ 
12 We use the trade openness of countries instead of trade costs to avoid losing observations when applying 
logarithms to the negative values of the variables, as Blonigen and Davies (2002) did.  
13 http://datainvex.comercio.es/  
14http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators#  
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Network;15 and the geographical distance, from the website http://es.distance.to/. Table A2 of 
the Appendix summarises the descriptive statistics on the data series of the variables. Lastly, the 
data on DTTs come from the Spanish Tax Agency16 and the Ministry of Finance and Public 
Function.17 We take the year of publication in the Official State Bulletin as the first year of the 
existence of the Agreements.18 Table 1 displays DTTs contracted before 2013 between Spain 
and the FDI partner countries of the sample. Hence, it also includes DTTs signed before the 
beginning of the sample period. 
As can be seen from Table 1, there are some partner countries which did not contract a DTT 
with Spain during the entire sample period. They are Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Panama, Paraguay and Peru. Despite this, the Spanish network of DTTs is wide and similar to 
that of other developed countries. 
3.2 Estimates and results 
Table 2 below displays the results of the direct effect of DTTs on FDI flows for the two 
samples. The first column shows the result for the sample of Spanish outbound FDI and the 
second one for the sample of Spanish inbound FDI. Following the Hausman test, fixed effects 
apply for the outbound sample and random effects for the inbound one. When fixed effects 
apply, time constant variables are captured by the country-pair effects and cannot be estimated 
because of the within transformation of the model. This applies to the variable distance and to 
the DTT variable for some countries in the sample. With regard to the variable distance, we 
remove it from Equation 1.1 (first column). For DTTs, when fixed effects apply, country-pair 
observations with a time constant value are eliminated from the estimates. These are country-
pair observations for which a DTT always exists (the DTT variable always takes the value of 
one) or country-pair observations for which a DTT never exists (the DTT variable always takes 
the value of zero). 
Thus, the estimate in the first column considers only those DTTs created during the sample 
period whose value changes from zero to one (all new DTTs except Ecuador, whose DTT was 
created in 1993) and the Danish DTT (an old DTT revoked in 2009), whose value changes from 
one to zero. Meanwhile, the estimate of the inbound sample (second column) takes into account 
all the country-pair observations in the sample, which encompasses both old and new DTTs as 
well as countries without a DTT throughout the sample period. 
 
_________________________ 
15 http://www.freetheworld.com/  
16http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/Inicio/La_Agencia_Tributaria/Normativa/Fiscalidad_Internacional/
Convenios_de_doble_imposicion_firmados_por_Espana/Convenios_de_doble_imposicion_firmados_por_Espana.sht
ml  
17 http://www.minhafp.gob.es/es-ES/Normativa%20y%20doctrina/Normativa/CDI/Paginas/cdi.aspx  
18 There is no unanimous rule regarding the starting date of the existence of DTTs in the empirical literature, either. 
Some authors “take the year of signature (e.g., Neumayer, 2007), while others take the year of ratification (e.g., 
Coupé, Orlova and Skiba, 2009)” (Barthel, Busse and Neumayer, 2010: 7). Barthel, Busse and Neumayer (2010) take 
the year when DTTs came into force, instead. 
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Table 1: Spanish Double Taxation Treaties: 1964–2013 
Signature Country 
1964 France*, Norway* 
1967 Switzerland 
1968 Austria, Finland, Germany*, Portugal* 
1972 Belgium*, Netherlands 
1974 Denmark**, Japan 
1975 Brazil 
1976 United Kingdom 
1977 Sweden 
1980 Italy, Romania 
1981 Canada, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
1982 Poland 
1987 Hungary, Luxembourg 
1990 U.S. 
1991 Bulgaria 
1992 Australia, China 
1993 Ecuador 
1994 Argentina**, Ireland, Mexico, South Korea 
1995 India 
1998 Bolivia 
2000 Russia 
2001 Israel 
2002 Iceland, Greece, Slovenia 
2004 Chile, Lithuania, Turkey, Venezuela 
2005 Estonia, Latvia 
2006 Croatia, Malta, New Zealand 
2008 Colombia 
2011 Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay 
Note: (*) Renegotiations: Portugal (1995), France (1997), Norway (2001), Belgium (2003) and Germany (2012); (**) 
Denounced DTT: Denmark (2008) and Argentina (2013). 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the Tax Agency: 
http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/Inicio_es_ES/La_Agencia_Tributaria/Normativa/Fiscalidad_Internaci
onal/Convenios_de_doble_imposicion_firmados_por_Espana/Convenios_de_doble_imposicion_firmados_por_Espan
a.shtml; and the Ministry of Finance and Public Function: 
http://www.minhafp.gob.es/es-ES/Normativa%20y%20doctrina/Normativa/CDI/Paginas/CDI_Alfa.aspx. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the existence of a DTT seems to be positively correlated to the volume of 
Spanish inbound and outbound FDI. Hence, DTTs functions affecting FDI positively, i.e. the 
limitation of double taxation and the increase in legal certainty, would have had, on average, a 
greater impact on investments than the function affecting FDI negatively, i.e. the limitation of 
tax avoidance and evasion.  
 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–22) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 10 
Table 2: Effect of DTTs on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI: Overall results 
 Spanish outbound FDI  
(1) 
Spanish inbound FDI 
 (2) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 2.87**(1.24) 4.23***(0.52) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) -0.07(0.09) -0.084(0.14) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.09(0.24) 2.96(2.71) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 0.16(0.21) -0.11(0.09) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.0005(0.0006) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X 0.0001(0.0005) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.04(0.03) 0.16(0.12) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.005(0.005) 0.007*(0.004) 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.25***( 0.07) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X -0.38**(0.16) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -0.94***(0.33) 
𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.87**(0.34) 0.57***(0.20) 
N 862 1,015 
R2 0.21 0.35 
Bilateral FE Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Despite the fact that our focus is on DTTs, here we briefly refer to the results regarding the 
other model variables. Some of them are common to both samples. The sum of the countries’ 
GDP, as proxy for the market size, affects FDI positively, which is in line with the high 
corporate profits at this scenario. Investment barriers act in the opposite direction and the same 
happens to distance for the inbound sample. The latter result could mean that transport and other 
trade related costs have a negative impact on FDI, which matches the vertical FDI motivation. 
Additionally, it might be indicating that a lower control over FDI discourages this activity. Of 
the remaining variables, only the coefficient of the trade openness of the home country is 
significant and positive, and only for the sample of Spanish inbound FDI, a result consistent 
with a vertical FDI motivation. 
Next, following the empirical literature, we disentangle the above results by separately 
estimating the different kinds of DTTs that originate them. For the outbound sample, we 
distinguish between the effect of new DTTs (𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠) and that of the Danish DTT (𝑓𝑑𝐿𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠). 
And for the inbound sample, we distinguish between the effect of new DTTs (𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠) and old 
DTTs (𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠). The new DTT variable takes the value of one those years when there is a new 
DTT in place between Spain and the corresponding partner country, i.e. a DTT created from 
1993 on, and the value of zero otherwise. The Danish DTT variable takes the value of one the 
years of the existence of the Danish DTT and the value of zero otherwise. And the old DTT 
variable takes the value of one in the years when an old DTT exists, i.e. a DTT created before 
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1993, and the value of zero otherwise. Regardless of the possible endogeneity problem, effects 
of old and new DTTs could differ because the effect of the Agreements could evolve over time. 
Additionally, we construct the variable renegotiated DTTs (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for identifying the 
effect of the five renegotiated DTTs. This variable takes the value of one in the years from 
which a DTT is renegotiated on and the value of zero otherwise. See Table 1 above for 
identifying the DTTs included in each group of DTTs. 
The equations incorporating the different kinds of DTTs for the outbound and inbound FDI 
samples are, respectively, the following:  
 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌1𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌2𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝜌3𝑓𝑑𝐿𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠+ 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 (2.1) 
 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼9ln (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑠) + 𝜌1𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌2𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+ 𝜌3𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 
 
(2.2) 
As Table 3 shows, results regarding the specific DTT variables differ between Spanish 
inbound and outbound FDI. Moreover, both samples must be interpreted differently due to the 
aforementioned issue regarding the time constant variables and the fixed effects. Starting with 
the new DTT variable, its coefficient is significant and positive only for the sample of Spanish 
inbound FDI. This result should be read as follows: new DTTs are positively related to FDI 
compared to other options, i.e. having no DTT in place or having an old DTT in place.19 With 
regard to old DTTs, there is also a positive relation to investments from abroad to Spain, its 
coefficient being higher than that of the new DTTs. For the outbound FDI sample the analysis 
of old DTTs is limited to the effect of the Danish DTT. We find a very high positive and 
significant result arising from its existence. Lastly, renegotiations seem not to be related to FDI: 
neither their existence compared to the previous non-renegotiated Agreement (as can be seen in 
column 1 of Table 3) nor their existence compared to the rest of the options has any effect on 
FDI (as can be seen in column 2 of Table 3). These results could be affected by the endogeneity 
problem referred to in Section 2. 
  
_________________________ 
19 When fixed effects apply, for the outbound FDI sample, the result is limited to country-pairs with a new DTT in 
place because the rest of the country-pair observations are always zero and thus, are eliminated from the estimates. 
For this group of countries, it compares the existence and non-existence of new DTTs.  
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Table 3: Effect of DTTs on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI: Types of DTTs 
 Spanish outbound FDI  
(1) 
Spanish inbound FDI  
(2) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 2.66**(1.24) 4.02***(0.57) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) -0.06(0.09) -0.07(0.14) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.13(0.24) 2.96(2.71) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 0.15(0.20) -0.11(0.09) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.0005(0.0006) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X 0.0002(0.0005) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.05(0.03) 0.16(0.12) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.004(0.005) 0.006(0.004)  
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.24***(0.07) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X -0.35**(0.16) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -0.84**(0.36) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.53(0.34) 0.50**(0.21) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.14(0.46) -0.27(0.45) 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 1.02*(0.54) 
𝒅𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 3.14***(1.18) X 
N 862 1,015 
R2 0.22 0.35 
Bilateral FE Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
3.3 The economic development of the contracting states 
In this sub-section, we analyse the results found in the previous section in more depth by 
differentiating two groups of Spanish partner countries – developed and developing.20 While 
the OECD and most of the EU members are developed countries, Latin American and the BRIC 
countries are usually less developed.  
In general terms, the internal law of economically developed countries provides companies 
with mechanisms for solving international taxation conflicts, i.e., double taxation and tax 
evasion (Baker, 2014). Thus, for these countries, the role of DTTs would be restricted to 
modifying these specific unilateral mechanisms. For instance, DTTs might modify the double 
_________________________ 
20 Information on the classification of countries by their level of economic development comes from the World 
Bank. Developed countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, United Kingdom, 
United States, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia and Uruguay. Developing countries are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Turkey and Venezuela. 
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taxation relief mechanism established by the internal legislation of countries or reduce the 
withholding tax rates of the source country. Additionally, DTTs could strengthen the legal 
certainty of the fiscal conditions for investors by limiting the unilateral performance of countries 
or by reinforcing the rules of the game. Therefore, for these countries, DTTs and the internal 
law complement each other. 
Meanwhile, the internal law of poorer countries is usually less developed than that of the 
richer ones. Hence, the importance of DTTs might be higher when one of the contracting states 
is a developing country. Particularly, legal certainty in the fiscal conditions which DTTs provide 
for investors could be a key positive determinant of FDI from developed to less developed 
countries. According to Edmiston et al. (2003) uncertainty is an important barrier for 
investments. Therefore, for these countries, sometimes DTTs could perform functions not 
accomplished by the internal law and sometimes they complement with such internal law. 
Table 4 shows the results for the outbound and inbound subsamples of developed partner 
countries and Table 5 for the subsamples of developing ones.21 Additionally, taking advantage 
of this categorization of countries, the effect of another kind of international bilateral Agreement 
on FDI is estimated for the group of less developed countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BIT). These Agreements are usually signed between developed and less developed countries to 
encourage investments from the first to the second group. Similarly to DTTs, a binary variable 
is created (𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑠). It takes the value of one when a BIT exists between a pair of countries and the 
value of zero otherwise. Information on Spanish BITs can be seen in Table A3 of the Appendix. 
It can be seen from Table 4 that DTTs results for developed countries are similar to those 
estimated for the whole sample (Table 3). The main difference is the higher estimated 
coefficient for old DTTs for the inbound sample (second column of Table 4). According to the 
reasoning above, as Spain and the contracting states are developed countries with unilateral 
mechanisms for solving international taxation problems, a deeper analysis of the content of 
DTTs and that of the internal law of countries is needed for interpreting the particular reasons 
behind these results. Results may, for instance, derive from a favourable double tax relief 
mechanism granted by the corresponding DTT or from the higher legal security standards 
provided by the Agreement. As stated before, DTTs limit the tax sovereignty of countries, set 
the allocation of taxing rights, harmonise tax definitions and introduce mechanisms for solving 
conflicting situations derived from international taxation. 
 
  
_________________________ 
21 For the developing countries samples, renegotiated DTTs are eliminated from the estimates because they do not 
exist for this group of countries. The same applies to the Danish DTT for this group of developing countries.  
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Table 4: Effect of DTTs on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI: Types of DTTs. Developed countries 
 Developed countries 
 Spanish outbound FDI  
(1) 
Spanish inbound FDI 
 (2) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 7.28***(2.84) 3.45***(0.58) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) 0.01(0.12) -0.17(0.17) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.36(0.29) -1.16(4.17) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 0.06(0.30) 0.05(0.15) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.0009(0.0008) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X -0.002(0.001) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.003(0.05) 0.01(0.16) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.003(0.006) 0.004(0.004) 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.11(0.10) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X -0.14(0.22) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -1.09***(0.34) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.44(0.43) 0.55**(0.28) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.19(0.43) -0.09(0.47) 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 2.12***(0.52) 
𝒅𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 3.15***( 1.09) X 
N 554 662 
R2 0.33 0.44 
Bilateral FE Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
In the developing countries sub-sample, a positive correlation between the existence of new 
DTTs and the outbound FDI is estimated compared to a situation without this type of DTT (first 
column of Table 5). We associate this result with a reinforcement of the fiscal conditions 
provided by DTTs for investors in developing countries. DTTs might additionally modify the 
internal mechanisms of Spain for the correction of double taxation or reduce the level of 
withholding tax rates of the developing countries. For the effect of DTTs on FDI from 
developing countries to Spain, results are less clear (second column of Table 5). On the one 
hand, the non-significant effect of new DTTs might mean that for investments by developing 
countries abroad, non-fiscal related FDI motivations of MNEs could precede fiscal ones. 
Traditionally investments go from developed countries to either developing or developed ones. 
On the other hand, the negative effect from old DTTs refers to a small number of DTTs: those 
signed with Brazil, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and China. 
Lastly, and contrary to our expectations, a significant and negative effect of the coefficient 
of BIT is found for FDI from Spain to developing countries and a null effect is found for FDI in 
the opposite direction. 
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Table 5: Effect of DTTs on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI: Types of DTTs. Developing countries 
 Developing countries 
 Spanish outbound FDI 
 (1) 
Spanish inbound FDI 
 (2) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 2.74**(1.35) 5.11***(1.15) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) 0.05(0.13) -0.44(0.36) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 -1.24***(0.47) -0.03(5.24) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 0.40(0.30) -0.02(0.19) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.001**(0.0007) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X 0.0007(0.0006) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.09*(0.04) 0.39**(0.18) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.004(0.01) 0.01(0.007)  
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.42***(0.09) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X -0.64**(0.26) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -0.78(1.09) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 1.07***(0.39) 0.29(0.36) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X X 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X -2.71**(1.34) 
𝒅𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒔𝒔 X X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.99**(0.40) -0.03(0.31) 
N 308 353 
R2 0.26 0.23 
Bilateral FE Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
4 The International Tax System applied by countries 
This section examines the clauses of DTTs defining the International Tax System agreed by 
countries, i.e., the clauses of DTTs defining the rules that countries must apply to correct 
international double taxation of foreign dividends. Although most DTTs take as a reference the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, their specific content varies along different dimensions. Our 
stand is that it is probably not possible to obtain an unambiguous result on FDI for the existence 
of a DTT, but it is probably possible to obtain some common results for specific provisions of 
their content. Furthermore, exploring the content of DTTs becomes very intriguing at a time 
when international taxation rules are being rethought and redesigned. Particularly, this analysis 
is more interesting than the simple use of a binary variable for countries like Spain which 
already have an extensive network of DTTs. 
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In the field of foreign direct investments, the International Tax System refers to the tax 
treatment given by the residence country22 of the investor to foreign dividends when 
repatriated, i.e. that given by Spain, regarding the Spanish outbound FDI sample, and that other 
given by the corresponding partner country, regarding the Spanish inbound FDI sample. There 
are two kinds of systems. The Territorial Tax System applies the exemption method for the 
correction of double taxation and the Worldwide Tax System, the credit method. Thus, the first 
one can produce tax saving for MNEs because it allows them to benefit from a possible lower 
foreign tax burden in comparison to the credit method, which requires MNEs to pay the 
difference between the domestic and the foreign tax burden, if positive. This tax saving can 
affect FDI positively. 
To test this hypothesis, two important assumptions must be made. The first is that, sooner or 
later, profits are repatriated. This assumption ensures that the possible tax saving will be 
realised. But even if at the end of the day it is not realised because profits are not repatriated,23 
the Territorial tax system can induce a positive effect on investments due to the initial expected 
tax saving. The second assumption is that dividends are repatriated as qualified dividends. This 
assumption allows for the classification of the International Tax System applied by countries 
into pure Territorial or Worldwide Systems, since the former usually applies for dividends that 
meet certain participation requirements.24 
They are the DTTs which declare either the exemption or the credit method for the relief of 
double taxation of dividends. At the same time, companies can apply the internal legislation of 
the corresponding residence country when it is more beneficial, that is, when it declares the 
exemption method (Falcón y Tella and Pulido, 2010). As a result, both norms, DTT and the 
internal law of the residence country, have to be simultaneously examined for defining the 
International Tax System applied by a country.  
The analysis of the International Tax System has to be made bilaterally for each year in the 
sample because of the bilateral nature of DTT and the specific requirements of the internal law 
of countries. That is, norms have to be examined with reference to a particular country and year. 
For instance, if one wants to analyse the effect of the International Tax System applied by Spain 
on investments from Spain to France, one has to identify that System from the content of the 
DTT between France and Spain and the internal law of Spain with reference to France. And if 
one wants to analyse the effect of the International Tax System applied by France on 
investments from France to Spain, one has to identify that System from the content of the DTT 
between France and Spain and the internal law of France with reference to Spain. Figure 1 
summarises this procedure. 
_________________________ 
22 The residence country, in terms of taxation, is the home country of investments, and the source country, in terms 
of taxation, is the host country of investments. 
23 There are some studies that examined the effect of the Territorial Tax System on repatriated profits (see, for 
instance, Hasegawa and Kiyota, 2017). 
24 The classification between pure Worldwide and Territorial systems does not actually always exist as such. 
Sometimes Territorial Tax Systems do not exempt foreign dividends completely, but they exempt a large part of 
them, instead. Moreover, not all Worldwide Tax Systems set the same type of tax credit. They can establish direct 
credits for eliminating juridical double taxation or direct and indirect credits for correcting economic as well as 
juridical double taxation. 
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Figure 1: Norms for the definition of the International Tax System applied by the residence country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: By the authors. 
 
Regarding the internal law of partner countries applied with reference to Spain, sources of 
information are PWC (2010, 2013a, 2013b), ZEW (2012) and diverse Web sites.25 Most 
countries had a Territorial system with Spain at sometime within the period. Spain applied it 
during the whole sample period with Brazil as defined by the DTT signed with this country and, 
according to its domestic legislation, with some other sample countries (basically those 
countries with which a DTT had been signed by that date) from 1996 on and with all countries 
from 2000 on, subject to the fulfilment of some requirements. 
Unlike the variable DTT, it is necessary to construct two tax saving variables: the tax saving 
variable for Spain, for the outbound sample (𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), and the tax saving variable for the 
corresponding residence country, for the inbound sample (𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). Each variable takes the 
value of zero when there is not tax saving, i.e. when the residence country applies a Worldwide 
Tax System, or when it applies a Territorial one but the foreign tax burden is higher than the 
domestic tax burden. It takes a positive value calculated from the difference between the 
domestic and the foreign tax burden when the country applies the Territorial Tax System and 
the foreign tax burden is lower than the domestic tax burden. For the sample of Spanish 
outbound FDI, the domestic tax burden of Spain and the foreign tax burden of the partner 
countries are calculated. And for the sample of Spanish inbound FDI, the domestic tax burden 
_________________________ 
25 Information on the aforementioned classification of countries can be provided on request. 
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of the partner countries and the foreign tax burden of Spain are calculated. Formulas for the 
calculation of the tax burdens are the following.  
For the foreign tax burden, FTB: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 = 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 + 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 ∗ �1 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠� (3.1) 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 = 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 + 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠) (3.2) 
 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) assume that Worldwide Tax Systems allow for the application of 
both a direct and an indirect tax credit of foreign taxes. 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 are the standard 
corporate income tax rate of the source country in year t and 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 and 𝑊𝑊𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 are the 
withholding tax rate on foreign dividends applied by the same country in year t. 
For the domestic tax burden, DTB: 
𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 =  𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠  (3.3) 
𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 =  𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠  (3.4) 
 
In Equations (3.3) and (3.4), 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠 and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑠are the standard corporate income tax rate of 
the residence country in year t. 
The variable tax saving is constructed as follows: 
 
• If the residence country applies the Worldwide Tax System:  
𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =0 or 𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =0 
 
• If the residence country applies the Territorial Tax System and FTB>DTB:  
𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =0 or 𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =0 
 
• If the residence country applies the Territorial Tax System and FTB<DTB:  
𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠=𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠-𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 or 𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠=𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠-𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 
 
Information on corporate income tax rates and withholding tax rates comes from the 
following data sources. Corporate income tax rates come, basically, from the KPMG Website.26 
When necessary, it is completed with information from the Ernst and Young guides (2004–
2013), Coopers and Lybrand (1994, 1995, 1998), TAXUD (2016) and the websites of the 
Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias27 and the OECD.28 Bilateral 
information on withholding tax rates comes from DTTs and the internal law of countries, in the 
_________________________ 
26 https://home.kpmg/kh/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html  
27http://www.ciat.org/index.php/es/productos-y-servicios/ciatdata/alicuotas.html  and Coopers and Lybrand (1994, 
1995, 1998) 
28 http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial  
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same way as information on International Tax Systems.29 For partner countries, information on 
their internal law comes from Ernst and Young (2004–2013), Coopers and Lybrand (1994, 
1995, 1998) and the EUR-Lex database regarding the date of application of the parent-
subsidiary directive 90/435/EEC.30  
The complete equations for the outbound and inbound FDI samples are thus, respectively, 
the following: 
 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝐿 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2𝑙𝐿 (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌1𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠  +𝜌2𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠+𝜌3𝑓𝑑𝐿𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌4𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 (4.1) 
 
𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼2ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼3𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼4�𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠ln (𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)� +𝛼5(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ) + 𝛼6𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼9ln (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑠) + 𝜌1𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 +𝜌2𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌3𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌4𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠 (4.2) 
In Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we maintain the binary variables measuring the average effect 
of the existence of DTTs in order to analyse the remaining effect of DTTs once a part of their 
content (tax saving derived from applying the Territorial Tax System) is controlled for. Results 
can be seen in Table 6 for the whole samples and in Table 7 for the subsamples of developed 
and developing partner countries. 
As shown in Table 6, the tax saving for companies resident in Spain, derived from the 
application of the Territorial Tax System, is very positively related to Spanish outbound FDI. 
The relation is also positive but not statistically significant regarding the tax saving for foreign 
companies and investments from their residence countries to Spain. This last result is consistent 
with the fact that the foreign tax burden, i.e. that of Spain, is rarely lower than the domestic tax 
burden, i.e. that of the corresponding partner country, given the high Spanish Corporate Income 
Tax rate in force in the period analysed in this paper. 
Additionally, results for the different kinds of DTT variables do not vary from those 
estimated before introducing the new tax saving variable (Table 3), which is consistent with the 
content of DTT. The tax saving does not originate in DTTs, since most of them declare the tax 
credit method for the correction of double taxation, i.e. it is the internal legislation of Spain 
which declares the exemption method.31 
_________________________ 
29 As we made for identifying the International Tax System applicable, we compared DTT and internal law and took 
the more beneficial withholding tax rate for companies, i.e. the lower one.  
30 The parent-subsidiary directive set a zero withholding tax rate for dividends distributed from EU subsidiaries to 
their EU parent companies, subject to the fulfilment of some requirements. 
31In an additional analysis, we estimate an interaction term between the variable  
𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠 and the variables 𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, instead of estimating each of the above fiscal variables 
separately. The coefficients of these variables are not significant for any sample. As stated above, although the 
International Tax System applied by countries is part of the content of DTT, the latter may become irrelevant in this 
matter when such internal law declares the exemption method for the correction of double taxation. In that case, the 
Territorial Tax System is applicable regardless of whether the DTT declares the credit method. 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–22) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 20 
Table 6: Effect of DTTs and the Territorial Tax System on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI:  
Types of DTTs 
 Spanish outbound FDI  
(1) 
Spanish inbound FDI  
(2) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 1.85(1.25) 4.05***(0.58) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) -0.037(0.09) -0.11(0.14) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.24(0.22) 2.54(2.78) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 0.19(0.20) -0.10(0.10) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.001***(0.0005) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X 0.0004(0.0006) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.04(0.03) 0.32(0.93) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.003(0.005) 0.007*(0.004)  
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.21***(0.07) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X -2.20(10.85) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -0.83**(0.37) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.44(0.33) 0.48**(0.22) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.29(0.43) -0.27(0.45) 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 1.01*(0.55) 
𝒅𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 3.24***(1.17) X 
𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 14.02***(2.48) X 
𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 1.93 
N 814 1,001 
R2 0.26 0.35 
Bilateral FE Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, the tax saving variable is also positively related to FDI from 
Spain to both developed and developing countries, the magnitude of the coefficient being 
particularly high for the latter. Likewise, the coefficient of this variable is not statistically 
significant for the inbound sub-samples and the results for the variables of the average effect of 
DTTs remain unchanged from those estimated previously (see Table 4 for developed countries 
and Table 5 for developing countries). 
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Table 7: Effect of DTTs and the Territorial Tax System on Spanish inbound and outbound FDI: Types of 
DTTs. Developed and developing countries 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 
Spanish outbound  
FDI  
(1) 
Spanish inbound  
FDI 
 (2) 
Spanish outbound 
FDI  
(3) 
Spanish inbound  
FDI  
(4) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 6.42**(2.86) 3.38***(0.60) 2.67**(1.30) 4.66***(0.95) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) -0.03(0.12) -0.24(0.17) 0.05(0.12) -0.55*(0.33) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.35(0.29) -2.76(4.25) -0.43(0.42) -0.31(4.82) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) -0.02(0.30) 0.11(0.15) 0.56*(0.29) 0.02(0.17) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.001(0.0009) X 0.001***(0.0007) X 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝟐  X -0.001(0.001) X 0.0007(0.0006) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.01(0.05) -0.02(1.25) 0.04(0.04) 1.26(1.46) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.003(0.006) 0.005(0.004)  0.003(0.01) 0.01** (0.007) 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -0.12(0.10) X -0.39***( 0.10) X 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 X 0.30(14.74) X -10.66(16.97) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) X -1.09***(0.35) X -0.49(0.79) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.42(0.44) 0.50*(0.28)  0.94**(0.41) 0.14(0.35) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 -0.06(0.43) -0.10(0.48) X X 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 2.08***(0.54) X -2.51**(0.99) 
𝒅𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 3.14***(1.10) X X X 
𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 5.64*(3.36) X 25.40***(3.79) X 
𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X 3.32(3.77) X -0.68(14.43) 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X X -0.95**(0.39) 0.05(0.32) 
N 541 650 273 351 
R2 0.34 0.44 0.36 0.26 
Bilateral FE Yes  Yes  
Bilateral RE  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
5 Robustness test: alternative data series on investments 
The robustness test conducted here is based on Equations (4.1) and (4.2) and consists of using 
alternative data series on FDI. It is performed for the overall sample and the subsamples of 
developed and developing countries. 
Immediate investor countries might be used more frequently than ultimate investor countries 
for accomplishing tax minimising strategies by MNEs. Indeed, a reduction of the tax burden 
could be the reason for the use of immediate investor countries. For this reason it is possible that 
the anti-tax evasion and avoidance function of DTTs has a more negative impact on investments 
when countries perform as immediate holders and thus, that the average effect of DTTs may be 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–22) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 22 
different depending on the immediate or ultimate FDI data. The differentiation of FDI data 
according to this criterion is only available for the Spanish inbound FDI in DataInvex. For the 
samples in this direction, we replicate the estimates of Equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the 
ultimate owner investor criterion for measuring the dependent variable. 
Results can be seen in Table 8. They do not differ substantially from those estimated in 
Table 6 and Table 7 for the overall sample and the subsamples of developed and developing 
countries, respectively. Therefore, it seems that there are no differences depending on the 
indicator used for measuring the dependent variable. 
6 Concluding remarks 
Nowadays, international taxation is a central issue on the agendas of international institutions 
due to the tax avoidance and evasion strategies of MNEs, which erode tax bases and tax 
collection worldwide. In this scenario, changes are being proposed to the rules governing its 
functioning. Our study focuses on DTTs, and analyses their impact on Spanish inbound and 
outbound FDI for the period 1993–2013. The paper tries to better understand the role of DTTs 
in fostering the cross-border economic activities of MNEs and contributes to filling the gap in 
the Spanish economic literature regarding international taxation issues. 
In general terms, we found that the existence of a DTT between Spain and another contracting 
state is positively related to the volume of FDI between them compared to a situation without a 
DTT. This positive result could have compensated, at least partially, the high costs of 
concluding international Agreements and it is in line with the main theoretical argument, which 
emphasises the traditional function of double taxation relief of DTTs. However, this general 
result should be viewed with caution. It depends on the sample examined, the kind of DTT and 
the level of development of Spain’s partner countries, which helps us to understand the 
conflicting results found in the empirical literature. Moreover, results have to be interpreted 
carefully because of an identification problem when fixed effects apply. 
For the group of developed partner countries, the positive relation between DTTs and FDI 
comes from the Danish DTT as to the outbound sample and from old and new DTTs concerning 
the inbound sample. For a better understanding of these results, a further investigation of the 
content of DTTs and that of the internal law of countries is needed. Also, the endogeneity 
problem may be playing a role.  
For the group of developing partner countries, new DTTs are positively related to Spain’s 
outbound FDI. We associate this positive result with a higher level of certainty of the fiscal 
conditions of developing countries for investors in the presence of DTTs: unlike developed 
countries, the internal law of developing countries may not be enough for solving international 
taxation situations. However, no positive result is found regarding investments from developing 
countries to Spain. Conversely, a negative coefficient is estimated for the small number of old 
DTTs existent between these countries and Spain. We think that for these investments it is 
possible that tax-related factors are less important than other factors for motivating FDI, since 
developing countries are not usually FDI exporter countries. 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–22) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 23 
Table 8: Effect of DTTs and the Territorial Tax System on Spanish inbound FDI: Types of DTTs. 
Ultimate owner investor sample and sub-samples 
 
Overall 
Sample 
(1) 
Developed 
Countries 
(2) 
Developing 
Countries 
(3) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) 4.32***(0.55) 3.90***(0.59) 5.12***(0.95) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝟐 ) -0.16(0.14) -0.22**(0.17) -0.51(0.33) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔 2.54(2.77) 1.32(4.13) -2.78(4.88) 
𝒅𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) -0.09(0.10) -0.02(0.15) 0.08(0.17) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔
𝟐  0.0001(0.0006) -0.003**(0.001) 0.0007(0.0007) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.41(0.93) -0.97(1.22) 2.92*(1.51) 
𝒔𝒕𝒔𝒔 0.006(0.004)  0.003(0.004)  0.01**(0.007)  
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔 -3.28(10.91) 11.87(14.30) -30.71*(17.60) 
𝐥𝐥 (𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔) -0.68**(0.34) -0.88**(0.35) -0.63(0.77) 
𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.56***(0.22) 0.66**(0.28) 0.08(0.36) 
𝒓𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.02(0.45) 0.15(0.47) X 
𝒕𝒅𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 0.87*(0.52) 1.91***(0.53) -2.91***(0.97) 
𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒔𝒅𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 3.12(3.35) 3.49(3.67) 2.72(14.95) 
𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 X X -0.22(0.33) 
N 1,001 650 351 
R2 0.37 0.47 0.29 
Bilateral FE    
Bilateral RE Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
When fixed effects apply, estimates are made by corrected least squares; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
With regard to the content of DTT, we obtained a positive relation between the tax saving 
derived from the application by Spain of the Territorial Tax System and Spain’s outbound 
investments. This result is found for all samples, the overall sample, the sample of developed 
countries and the sample of developing countries, with an especially high coefficient estimated 
for the last. This result confirms the heterogeneous impact of the content of the DTT itself. 
However, the International Tax System represents only a part of the DTT content, which 
complements the internal legislation of countries. Additionally, the estimated coefficient for the 
tax saving variable is not significant for any Spanish inbound sample. This is in line with the 
fact that when Spain acts as the host country of investments there are hardly any tax savings for 
the investing countries because of the high Spanish Corporate Income Tax rate in force in the 
period analysed. 
In line with the heterogeneous content of DTTs, there is a great deal of supplementary work 
to do in the future. An interesting line of research could consist of analysing the evolution of 
those DTT provisions relating to the anti-tax avoidance and evasion function of DTTs and their 
interaction with the results reached in this paper. A reinforcement of the anti-tax avoidance and 
evasion function of DTTs may have impacted FDI negatively. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Review of the empirical literature on the effect of Double Taxation Treaties  
on Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Sample 
 
Empirical model and 
econometric technique 
Variables 
Results 
FDI indicators DTT indicators 
Blonigen and 
Davies (2000) 
U.S.; 
1966–1992 
 
Gravity model and 
Markusen model; 
OLS 
Bilateral inbound 
and outbound FDI: 
Stock, flows, sales 
and number of 
foreign affiliates 
DTT; 
 
Number of years of DTT 
(also squared) 
 
Positive (at least 
some time after 
the DTT 
signature) 
Blonigen and 
Davies (2002) 
OECD; 
1982–1992 
Markusen model; 
Pool, FE 
Bilateral FDI: 
Stock, flows 
DTT; 
 
New DTT 
Old DTT 
 
Negative or null 
from new DTT 
Davies (2003) 
U.S.; 
1996–2000 
Markusen model; 
OLS 
Bilateral inbound 
and outbound FDI: 
Stock and sales 
DTT 
Renegotiated DTT 
Null 
Blonigen and 
Davies (2004) 
U.S.; 
1980–1999 
Markusen model; 
FE 
Bilateral inbound 
and outbound FDI: 
Stock 
 
DTT; 
 
New DTT 
Old DTT 
 
 
Negative or null 
from new DTT 
di Giovanni 
(2005) 
193 countries; 
1990–1999 
Gravity model; 
FE 
 
Aggregate data on 
cross-border 
Merger and 
Acquisitions: Flows 
DTT Positive 
Egger et al. 
(2006) 
OECD; 
1985–2001 
Model similar to 
Markusen model; 
Differences in 
Differences 
Bilateral outbound 
FDI: Stock 
 
New endogenous DTT 
 
 
Negative 
Neumayer 
(2007) 
Developing 
countries; 
1970–2001 
Alternative model; 
FE 
 
U.S. bilateral FDI: 
Stock and 
aggregate data on 
OECD FDI (flows 
and stock); in 
relative terms to 
developing 
countries total 
DTT 
 
Positive, but only 
on investments 
received by 
middle-income 
developing 
countries 
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inbound FDI 
Stein and  
Daude 
(2007) 
OECD; 
1997–1999 
(average). 
Gravity model and 
Markusen model; 
OLS, Tobit 
FDI from 17 OECD 
countries to 58 
countries: Stock 
DTT Positive 
Louie and 
Rousslang 
(2008) 
U.S.; 
1992, 1994 and 
1996 
Alternative model 
Rates of return on 
FDI 
DTT 
 
Null from old and 
new DTT 
Coupé et al. 
(2009) 
Transition 
countries; 
1990–2001 
Gravity model; 
OLS, RE, FE 
Bilateral FDI from 
OECD countries to 
transition countries: 
Flows 
DTT 
 
Old and new DTT 
 
Temporal effects 
Null (positive and 
negative effects 
are compensated) 
Barthel et al. 
(2010) 
30 FDI home 
countries (10 
developing 
countries) and  
105 FDI host 
countries (84 
developing 
countries); 
1978–2004 
Model based on the 
typical determinants of 
FDI; 
FE, GMM 
 
Bilateral FDI: Stock 
DTT; 
 
Years of DTT 
Positive 
Davies et al., 
(2010) 
Sweden; 
1965–1998 
Gravity model; 
OLS, Probit 
Affiliate level FDI 
data: Sales, 
composition of 
sales 
New DTT 
 
Heterogeneous on 
the composition 
of sales: Null on 
the margin and 
positive on the 
establishment of a 
new affiliate 
Ohno (2010) 
Japan; 
1981–2003 
Gravity model; 
GMM 
Outbound FDI to 
13 Asian countries: 
Flows 
New DTT (short, 
medium and long term) 
Reviewed DTT 
New DTT (indirect 
effect) 
Reviewed DTT (indirect 
effect) 
 
Positive in the 
long term from 
new DTT 
Baker (2014) 
Transition 
countries; 
1991–2006 
Markusen model; 
Differences in 
Differences 
Outbound FDI from 
OECD countries to 
developing 
countries: Flows 
New DTT contracted 
between developed and 
less developed countries 
Null: DTT do not 
exert any effect 
on FDI 
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Blonigen et 
al. (2014) 
U.S.; 
1987–2007 
Markusen model; 
FE 
Affiliate level FDI 
data: Sales, number 
of affiliates 
New DTT 
 
Positive 
Bösenberg et 
al. (2016) 
187 signatory 
countries; 
1900–2013 
The most important 
observable non-DTT 
(economic and political) 
determinants; 
Exponential-family 
generalised-linear models 
Number of affiliates 
held by 
headquarters 
bilaterally 
Content of three 
dimensions of 3.300 
DTT and 11 OECD 
model Tax Treaties 
Heterogeneous: 
Specific content 
of DTT 
Hong (2017) 
70 countries; 
2012 
Five bilateral variables to 
describe the 
relationship between a 
pair of countries (a shared 
border, a common official 
language, a common 
legal origin, a colonial 
relationship and 
distance), Corporate 
Income Tax and GDP 
Bilateral FDI: Stock 
Tax rate matrix from a 
network of DTT 
between 70 countries 
A tax-minimising 
direct route is 
positively related 
to FDI via the 
direct route 
Kumas and 
Millimet 
(2017) 
Sample of 
Blonigen and 
Davies (2004) 
Model similar to 
Markusen model; 
OLS, panel data 
Bilateral inbound 
and outbound FDI: 
Stock, flows, sales 
New DTT; 
 
Temporal effects 
Heterogeneous: 
Positive effects of 
DTTs at lower 
quantiles of the 
distribution of 
FDI, but negative 
effects in the 
upper quantiles 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 (outbound), real 2005 USD 1023 7.14e+08 2.52e+09 33.2671 3.76e+10 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 (inbound), real 2005 USD 1134 3.06e+08     1.30e+09     52.0294 2.17e+10 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 (inbound, ultimate owner), real 2005 USD 1134 2.96e+08     1.25e+09     52.0294 2.23e+10 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠, real 2005 USD 1167 1.72e+12 1.78e+12 7.52e+11    1.56e+13 
𝑓𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠
2 , real 2005 USD 1167 3.18e+24 1.70e+25 7.33e+17    1.78e+26 
𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠, difference of average years of schooling for 
people over 25 1176 1.758355 1.322271 0 6.7825 
𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠  1167 2.12e+12 5.36e+12 0 4.42e+13 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 , 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 (Spain), percentage of GDP 1176 54.94553 7.286469 36.961 65.8384 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 , 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 (partner country), percentage of GDP 1152 81.91036 46.78701 14.9328 333.532 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠
2  (Spain) 1176 262.9192 383.5762 0 3028.72 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠
2  (partner country) 1152 317.396 409.7919 0 2697.6 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 (Spain), score on a scale of 0 to 10 1064 2.380526 1.072705 0.89 4.01 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠 (partner country), score on a scale of 0 to 10 972 2.866564 1.530049 0 7.82 
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑠, Kilometres 1176 5120.625 4198.43 503 19853 
𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠, Kilometres 1176 0.7117347 0.4531479 0 1 
𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠 1176 0.460034 0.4986122           0 1 
𝐿𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠 1176 0.2517007     0.4341748    0 1 
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠 1176 0.0527211     0.2235712 0 1 
𝑓𝑑𝐿𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑠 1176 0.0136054     0.1158955 0 1 
𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠 1176 0.4005102 0.4902103 0 1 
𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠 (Spain),  
difference of tax rates on a per unit basis  1066 0.0347517  0.0532051 0 0.25 
𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑑𝑡𝑓𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑠(partner country),  
difference of tax rates on a per unit basis 1144 0.0050636     0.0238041 0 0.2467 
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Table A3: Spanish Bilateral Investment Treaties: 1992–2013 
Signature Country 
1992 Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia  
1993 Poland 
1994 South Korea, Uruguay 
1995 Romania 
1996 Dominican Republic, Lithuania, Peru 
1997 Latvia, Paraguay, Venezuela 
1998 Bulgaria, Croatia, Ecuador, Estonia, Panama, Turkey 
1999 Costa Rica, India 
2000 Slovenia 
2002 Bolivia 
2004 Guatemala 
2007 Colombia 
2008 China, Mexico 
                      Source: Own elaboration from the Ministry of Trade: http://www.comercio.es/acuerdos. 
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